What’s it about?: British soldier and military historian B. H. Liddell Hart‘s advocation of military strategy and tactics of disorienting an opponent psychologically and physically. For Hart, victory came from “the line of least resistance and the line of least expectation,” as opposed to brute force and superior naval power, which was the norm at the time. Emphasising movement, flexibility, and the element of surprise, the indirect approach is such that it becomes easier to win the battle, often before it begins.
My opinion: This text is rich with examples from history, from the battles of Ancient Greece, to the struggle against a heavily armed and ascendant Nazi Germany. The Battle of Leuctra is one. The Greek general Epaminondas weighted his left wing and held back his right, which threw the Spartans off. The Allied invasion of Normandy in World War II is another. The Germans were expecting an attack on the Pas-de-Calais region, but the landing operation on that day on June of 1944 showed the ingenuity of the Allies. These are just two examples, but the point is that by taking a creative approach to disorienting the enemy, great battles can be won without even having to fight.
Hart is hugely influential in business and military spheres. In the latter half of the twentieth-century, the Australian Defence Force developed its first in independent and operational doctrine. The indirect approach was cited as a key influence. After the Vietnam War, the Australian military was looking to turn away from all-out warfare across continents, looking to use force in a minimal fashion. Hart’s articulation of the old “strategic bypass” served to strengthen the our military during this time of fundamental change. You could debate how (or if) the theories of Hart came into play in Afghanistan and Iraq. Such theories are surely worth revisiting, as many times as needed. Considering the lives that can be saved with the indirect approach, and less emphasis on numbers and firepower, how can it not be valuable?
The parts that make up Strategy were written variously from 1929 to the end of World War II. The current edition of the text is a reprint, and some have said that it is obvious the pages are photocopied. I don’t care about this one way or the other, but for some it’s a dealbreaker. Make of that what you will.
I recommend not only Strategy, but just about all of Hart’s works. They sit nicely alongside those of Sun-Tzu and Von Clausewitz, for anyone interested in history and/or military strategy.
Lawrence Deveney 